The Failure to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism by Nicola, Fernanda Giorgia, Dr.
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Working Papers Works 
7-2020 
The Failure to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in European 
Constitutionalism 
Fernanda Giorgia Nicola Dr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/fac_works_papers 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the European Law Commons 
 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  C O P E N H A G E N  













iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 201, 2020 
 
IMAGINE Paper No. 8 
 
The Failure to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in 
European Constitutionalism 
 
The First IMAGINE Workshop 
 
Jeffrey Miller & Fernanda Nicola 
 
 
iCourts – The Danish National Research Foundation’s 
Centre of Excellence for International Courts 
 
  




Since the 1980s prominent scholars of European legal integration have used the example of U.S. 
constitutionalism to promote a federal vision for the European Community.  These scholars, 
drawing lessons from developments across the Atlantic, concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
played a key role in fostering national integration and market liberalization. They foresaw the 
possibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be a catalyst for a similar federal and 
constitutional outcome in Europe. The present contribution argues that the scholars who constructed 
today’s dominant European constitutional paradigm underemphasized key aspects of the U.S. 
constitutional experience, including judgments that favored states’ rights doctrines that buttressed 
the social plagues of slavery and laissez faire policies that reinforced economic inequality. This 
selective reception of the U.S. experience, bracketing racial subordination and neoliberal policies 
under the rubric of states’ rights, propelled European constitutionalism into a neverland—one that 
claimed to draw inspiration from U.S. constitutionalism, while simultaneously dismissing as 
irrelevant some of its most profound socio-economic challenges. This is important, we argue, 
because the dominant European constitutional paradigm not only provides a distorted picture of 
U.S. constitutionalism, but also inhibits a deeper understanding of the European one due to its 
inability to grapple with racial capitalism, embedded both in its colonial past and its present ECJ 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
 
KEYWORDS: European constitutional imaginaries, Racial capitalism, Comparative Federalism, 
U.S. Supreme Court, European Court of Justice, Constitutional History, Slavery and Economic 
Inequality. 
 
Jeffrey Miller is an assistant professor of business at Gallaudet University (Washington DC, USA) 
and a project manager at the Academy of European Law, European University Institute (Florence, 
Italy). 
 
Fernanda Nicola is Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of Law, 
Director of the Program of International Organizations, Law and Development; Permanent Visiting 
Professor at iCourts 
Emails: fnicola@american.edu; jeffrey.miller@eui.eu  
 
IMAGINE has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 803163). 












The iCourts Working Paper Series is funded by the Danish National Research Foundation Grant no. 

















iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts - focuses on the ever-growing role of 
international courts, their place in a globalizing legal order, and their impact on politics and society 
at large. To understand these crucial and contemporary interplays of law, politics, and society, 
iCourts hosts a set of deeply integrated interdisciplinary research projects on the causes and 
consequences of the proliferation of international courts. 
 
iCourts opened in March 2012. The centre is funded by a large grant from the Danish National 
Research Foundation (for the period 2012-18). 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647178
4 
 
The Failure to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism 
 
Jeffrey Miller1 and Fernanda Nicola2 © 
 
The paper was written as part of a workshop organized in the framework of the Project IMAGINE, 
which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s 




Since the 1980s prominent scholars of European legal integration have used the example of U.S. constitutionalism to 
promote a federal vision for the European Community.  These scholars, drawing lessons from developments across the 
Atlantic, concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court had played a key role in fostering national integration and market 
liberalization. They foresaw the possibility for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be a catalyst for a similar federal 
and constitutional outcome in Europe. The present contribution argues that the scholars who constructed today’s dominant 
European constitutional paradigm underemphasized key aspects of the U.S. constitutional experience, including judgments 
that favored states’ rights doctrines that buttressed the social plagues of slavery and laissez faire policies that reinforced 
economic inequality. This selective reception of the U.S. experience, bracketing racial subordination and neoliberal policies 
under the rubric of states’ rights, propelled European constitutionalism into a neverland—one that claimed to draw 
inspiration from U.S. constitutionalism, while simultaneously dismissing as irrelevant some of its most profound socio-
economic challenges. This is important, we argue, because the dominant European constitutional paradigm not only provides 
a distorted picture of U.S. constitutionalism, but also inhibits a deeper understanding of the European one due to its inability 
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2 Professor of Law at American University, Washington College of Law, Director of the Program of International 
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only. 
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This article provides a critical analysis of EU-U.S. comparative constitutional research. While the 
EU-U.S. comparison provided a fertile meeting ground during the Cold War for scholars interested 
in questions involving the rule of law, separation of powers, and federalism, it was also a minefield 
due to the tainted history of slavery at the heart of the U.S. Constitution.3 At a time when France 
and Belgium were still colonial powers, rather than compare the history of slavery in the U.S. with 
the history of European colonialism, the founders of the European integration project promoted 
the idea of a tabula rasa or “clean slate” narrative after the horrors of the Nazi regime.4 By the 1960s, 
scholars viewed the newly-formed European Economic Community as a break from, rather than a 
partial continuation of, Nazism, Fascism and colonialism.5 
 
U.S. constitutionalism may have supplied “a common vocabulary for the language of European 
integration” and a “conceptual toolbox” to understand the ECJ’s rulings.6 But on the whole, 
European legal scholarship has shown a much greater interest in borrowing abstract concepts and 
terminology than in studying the less-than-pristine ways in which these concepts have been put to 
practical use in the United States.  As a result, while U.S. jurists have had to come to terms with the 
 
 
3 See MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP (2016), and for a more generous reading, SEAN WILENTS, NO 
PROPERTY IN MAN (2019). 
4 See KAIUS TUORI, EMPIRE OF LAW: NAZI GERMANY, EXILE SCHOLARS AND THE BATTLE FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
1, 8 (forthcoming, 2020) (arguing that legal scholars, especially ones in exile after WWII, “wrote about the Europe of 
law as a hope and aspiration, arguing for the language of the rule of law, rights and reason against the language of blood 
and culture embraced by the nationalistic and totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany”). See also JAMES WHITMAN, 
HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL (2017) (showing how Nazi racial laws has been themselves inspired by American race 
laws and racial capitalism). 
5 See DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE. THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM OVER EUROPE AND 
ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS (CHRISTIAN JOERGES AND NAVRAJ SINGH GHALEIGH, EDS. 2003); PEO HANSEN, STEFAN 
JONSSON EURAFRICA, THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND COLONIALISM (2014). 
6 Giuseppe Martinico, Reading the Others: American Legal Scholars and the Unfolding European Integration, 11 EUR. 
JL REFORM 35 (2009). 
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concept of racial capitalism7 and with the failure of the separate-but-equal doctrine,8 scholars of 
European integration have shied away from tracing the connection of populist movements and 
white supremacist ideologies to Europe’s colonial past and capitalist foundations. This is important, 
we argue, because only by shedding light on Europe’s history of colonialism and racial 
differentiation inherent to capitalism can the project of integration continue towards a more 
inclusive, equal, and democratic constitutional settlement.9 
Our contribution shows how influential scholars of European legal integration such as Eric Stein, Mauro 
Cappelletti, and Joseph H.H. Weiler provided important bridges between the two continents, but also 
contributed to the reproduction of a liberal legalist understanding of the evolution of U.S. federal judiciary 
power as a neutral one. As a consequence, the dominant European constitutional law paradigm tends to 
marginalize the role of U.S. states’ rights movements connected to racial subordination and economic 
inequality in the shaping of U.S. federalism. A liberal legalist perspective, which places considerable 
confidence in the ability of judges to make wise decisions for the betterment of society,10 tends to 
downplay the fact that judicial law-making can lead (and has led) to the protection of slavery, the 
endorsement of segregation, and the entrenchment of laissez faire and neoliberal policies—all with the 
imprimatur of the U.S. Supreme Court’s judicial review power.11  
This shortcoming runs in parallel with European law scholarship’s under-appreciation of the role of 
Europe’s colonial past and a failure to grapple with racial capitalist dynamics that reinforced ethnic 
 
 
7 See OLIVER COX, CASTE, CLASS, & RACE; A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS (1948) defining racial antagonism as part of 
the class struggle, because it developed within the capitalist system as one of its fundamental traits. Cox explained how: 
“Our hypothesis is that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism 
and nationalism, and that because of the world-wide ramifications of capitalism, all racial antagonisms can be traced to 
the policies and attitudes of the leading capitalist people, the white people of Europe and North America.” (Kindle 
Locations 8327-8329) and for a full analysis of Cox’s book see 
http://www.racismreview.com/blog/2011/12/21/capitalism-and-racism-remembering-the-great-oliver-c-cox/. 
8 See NICHOLAS GUYATT, BIND US APART: HOW ENLIGHTENED AMERICANS INVENTED RACIAL SEGREGATION (2019). 
9 See AIMEE CESAR, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (1972). 
10 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
11 This partial reception of the U.S. constitutional experience in Europe helps to explains why scholars, judges, and civil 
servants did not seriously engage with questions of states’ rights, slavery and equal protection jurisprudence in the 
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differentiations within the Community.12 While formally ending colonialism, the European founding 
fathers were also “securing its continuation”13 by protecting and encasing new trade and investment 
regimes between the Community and its former colonies.14 This aspect of the evolution of European law 
is incongruent with the image of the Community as a tabula rasa and has received only limited attention 
by lawyers. However, after the 2008 financial crisis which led to blaming the “lazy” Greeks and letting 
the “ industrious” Germans have a final say on the European Central Bank’s bailouts, the fiction of 
eliminating ethnicities in the European Union has instead reinforced new forms of racisms15 and market 
hierarchies16 which are well-entrenched in European racial capitalism.17 
We do not intend to suggest, implicitly or otherwise, that a closer reading of U.S. legal history would 
provide scholars with a clear roadmap out of the EU current legal crises. The U.S. Supreme Court most 
certainly has not discovered the “magic bullet” that definitively settles the tension between local and 
federal powers, overcomes the legacy of white supremacy, or manages to fully grapple with racial 
capitalism.18 Our contention is considerably more modest; namely, that the unvarnished record provides 
 
 
multi-volume INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (MAURO CAPPELLETTI, 
MONICA SECCOMBE AND JOSEPH H. H. WEILER EDS. 1986).  
12 CEDRIC J.  ROBINSON, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983) explaining its legacy as “Capitalism 
was “racial” not because of some conspiracy to divide workers or justify slavery and dispossession, but because 
racialism had already permeated Western feudal society. The first European proletarians were racial subjects (Irish, 
Jews, Roma or Gypsies, Slavs, etc.) and they were victims of dispossession (enclosure), colonialism, and slavery within 
Europe. Indeed, Robinson suggested that racialization within Europe was very much a colonial process involving 
invasion, settlement, expropriation, and racial hierarchy.” Boston Review here 
13 See PEO HANSEN, STEFAN JONSSON EURAFRICA, supra note 5 [showing how the project of “Eurafrica” was very 
much alive during the Treaty of Rome negotiations] (1955-7). 
14 See QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS (2018). 
15 See DIMITRY KOCHENOV, CITIZENSHIP (MIT 2019); UGO MATTEI AND LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF 
LAW IS ILLEGAL (2008).  
16 See Damjan Kukovec, Economic Law, Inequality and Hidden Hierarchies on the EU Internal Market, 38 Michigan 
Journal of International Law (2016). 
17 See Walter Johnson, To Remake the World Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice from Boston Review (2018) 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/walter-johnson-to-remake-the-world. 
18 Despite the achievements of the Warren Court against racial discrimination, critical race scholars have provided 
important critiques of its Brown legacy. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2005). Today racial discrimination persists, especially against black men that 
come into contact with the criminal justice system. See ANGELA DAVIS, POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, 
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scholars with more useful insights than the selective version of U.S. constitutionalism that prevails in 
much European legal discourse. 
In Part I we turn our attention to the reception of U.S. constitutionalism in Europe. The journey begins 
with Eric Stein’s contribution to the study of European Community law and narrates how he became, 
through his strategic friendship with Michel Gaudet, the director of the Commission’s Legal Services,19 
a supporter of expanding the powers of the ECJ. Stein promoted an ambitious judicial constitutional 
project for Community law in the footsteps of the Warren Court. Stein’s approach also set aside some of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s most infamous rulings,20 which still haunt the Court to this day.21 Because of 
 
 
PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT (2019). In the New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander powerfully demonstrated the 
pernicious effects of discrimination with respect to laws concerning convicted criminals and the war on drugs. See 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) and how the 
U.S. still remains in deep denial of this situation, The Injustice of this Moment is Not an “Aberration” (NYT 17 of January 
2020). In a similar way, Paul Butler shows how racial injustice continues to persevere in the criminal justice system. See 
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (The New Press, 2017). Among comparative lawyers, James 
Whitman has traced, through an intellectual and sociological history of the concept of dignity, the great disparity between 
U.S. and European treatment of criminal offenders, which has resulted in the well-known disenfranchisement of civil 
rights and liberties of large numbers of African-Americans. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).This literature shows with piercing 
clarity that despite the achievements vis-à-vis anti-discrimination law, the U.S. constitutional experience, especially when 
it comes to the criminal justice system, continues to have a disproportionally adverse impact on black lives. See Alicia 
Garza, A History of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, The Feminist Wire. Retrieved October 15, 2015; PATRISSE KHAN-
CULLORS, WHEN THEY CALL YOU A TERRORIST: A BLACK LIVES MATTER MEMOIR (2018). 
19 Julie Bailleux, Michel Gaudet a law entrepreneur: the role of the legal service of the European executives 
in the invention of EC Law and of the Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2; COMMON MARKET LAW 
REVIEW, pp. 359-367 (2013).   
20 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (In an opinion written by Justice Taney the majority held that “a 
negro, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves,” whether enslaved or free, could not be an 
American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court.); See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944) (ruling that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the 
Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic military imperative of the 
President.). 
21 See Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (commonly referred to as the “Travel Ban case”); Robert Tsai, How 
Activists Resisted—and Ultimately Overturned—an Unjust Supreme Court Decision, WASHINGTON POST,(Jan. 30, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647178
10 
 
the deep synergies between states’ rights and segregation policies supported by white supremacist 
ideologies in the U.S., Stein’s reluctance to engage with national resistances to federal power in Europe 
is perhaps understandable, but it had the consequence of presenting a rather skewed image of U.S. 
constitutional law practice. 
Part II focuses on the European reception of U.S.-style federal judicial review, and in particular on its 
liberal legalist understanding through the influential works of Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph H. H. Weiler. 
Because of what Duncan Kennedy calls the ‘legitimation effect,’22 scholars of European integration still 
promote judicial review as a neutral instrument in the hands of supranational judges dedicated to the 
protection of individual rights and the resolution of quasi-federal conflicts based on institutional 
competence arguments rather than the very interests they are contending within it.23 Frequently 
underestimated in European legal scholarship are the periods when the U.S. federal judicial power 
promoted racial segregation, 24 did not adequately protected minority rights through equal protection 
doctrines25 or endorsed freedom of contract to entrench laissez faire policies.26 In the mid-1980s, the 





22 DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1997) [explaining how the legitimation effect in 
judicial law making is the attitude about social reality that the desirability for radical social change is replaced by a 
moderate reformist one.] 
23 Id. p. 252 [showing how federalism meant the ‘withdrawal’ of the allocation of federal or state power form the 
political discussion]. 
24 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) [in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of racial 
segregation laws for public facilities as long as these were "separate but equal"]. 
25 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), [the Supreme Court held that that laws having a racially 
discriminatory effect but with a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the Fourteenth Amendement]. 
26 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in which the Supreme Court held that a New York law limiting the 
working hours for bakers violated the Fourteen Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
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deregulation through limits to the Commerce Clause.27 This new line of states’ rights jurisprudence was 
once again downplayed by European legal scholars focusing on U.S. constitutionalism.28 
In Part III, we turn our attention to the consequences of setting aside the aspects of the U.S. federal 
experience, such as states’ rights, that were synonymous with racial subordination and the entrenchment 
of economic inequalities. In either form, the constitutional doctrines of states’ rights were deemed 
irrelevant by scholars of European legal integration due to the fact that the “clean slate” narrative could 
overcome racial subordination as ethnic differentiation characterizing the European Community. As 
powerfully described in Aimé Cesar’s Discourse on Colonialism, most scholars of European integration have 
avoided the obvious comparison between the U.S. legitimation of slavery and the colonial and white 
supremacist ideologies at the root of the “Europe of Adenauer, Schuman and Bidault.”29 In this way, 
scholars unable to come to terms with racial capitalism could construe a European constitutional utopia 











27 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (holding that the Federal Gun Free Zone Act of 1990 exceeded 
Congress’ authority under the commerce clause). 
28 See Daniela Caruso, E.U. Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. L. 175, 182 (2011) [showing that 
the 1990s’ interest of some U.S. constitutionalist scholars in the dynamics of European integration was partly due to the 
‘Rehnquist effect’ – i.e. to the fact that Europe’s seemingly apolitical federalism could shield the Rehnquist Court from 
its critics.] 
29 See AIMEE CESAR, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (1972) p. 37. 
30 See ECHOES OF EMPIRE: MEMORY, IDENTITY AND COLONIAL LEGACIES (Kalypso Nicolaidis, Berny Sebe & Gabrielle 
Maas eds., 2015). 
31 See Peo Hansen & Stefan Jonsson, Euroafrica Incognita: The Colonial Origins of the European Union, History of the 
Present, 7 History of the Present, 1, 1–32 (2017). 
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I.   The Legacy of Eric Stein in Constructing the European Vision of U.S. Constitutionalism  
 
1. Judicial Supremacy: From the Marshall to the Warren Court 
 
We begin with Eric Stein, author of the seminal article, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution,32 and the person widely regarded as the main figure responsible for the “leading paradigm on 
the nature of European law.”33 In his 1981 essay, Stein argued that the ECJ had interpreted the Founding 
treaties “in a constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology.” 
34  As Boerger has shown in her extensive research, Stein’s life experiences are relevant to his approach 
to U.S. constitutional law doctrines and how he applied these concepts to analyze Community law.  
 
Stein was born in 1913 into a Jewish family in Holice, a small town east of Prague, in the then-Austro-
Hungarian Empire. He received a classical civil law education at Charles University in Prague and was 
subsequently drafted into the Czech army. He served in the Czech infantry until March 1939, when the 
Nazis took control of the country and dissolved the Czech military. Stein fled Czechoslovakia in August 
1939 and, after a harrowing journey, arrived in New York at the age of 26. In 1942, with financial 
assistance from his relatives, he graduated with a J.D. from the University of Michigan, and then 
proceeded to enlist in the U.S. army. In 1946, Stein joined the U.S. State Department’s newly formed 
Bureau of the United Nations, where he advised U.S. representatives to the UN General Assembly and 
UN Security Council for nine years. 
 
Stein followed the European integration process from its earliest days. His article, The European Coal and 
Steel Community: The Beginning of Its Judicial Process, was the first English-language publication on the topic. 
In the same year (1955), he joined the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School. As Boerger 
 
 
32 Eric Stein, Lawyers judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1-27 (1981). 
33 Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarship on the European Union: The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 859, 861 (2014). 
34 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (1981). 
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explains, Stein’s turn to European law coincided with his dissatisfaction with the potential of international 
law to ensure world peace.35  
 
In A Quiet Revolution,36 Weiler, who became a law professor at the University of Michigan  “thanks in part 
to the unconditional support of Stein”,37 observed that the intellectual voyage from international law to 
EC law was typical for the first generation of scholars of European integration.38 The Cold War was an 
inauspicious period for the construction of an international legal system. By contrast,  
 
“Community law and the ECJ were everything that an international lawyer could 
dream about: The Court was creating a new order of international law in which norms 
were norms, sanctions were sanctions, courts were central and frequently used . . . 
Community law, as transformed by the ECJ, was an antidote to the international legal 
malaise.”39 
 
Stein’s path-breaking re-conceptualization of Community law continues to influence EU legal scholarship 
to this day, but his work was by no means neutral or detached. For very understandable reasons, Stein 
 
 
35 Id. at 869 (“. . . Stein had grown deeply disillusioned by the shortcomings of the United Nations, which by then had 
proved incapable of unifying the world under the rule of law. Like others in the immediate postwar years, Stein had 
initially embraced his job at the Bureau of the United Nations with some sort of missionary zeal and the hope that the 
new organization would prevent conflicts and atrocities similar to ones that had just destroyed his own family. When 
the Cold War set in and prevented any progress, he grew increasingly frustrated. As he recalled much later, he was 
however ‘not [yet] prepared to accept the idea that law and institutions were irrelevant in the international system.’ As a 
result, studying the innovative legal and institutional developments in Europe somehow offered an attractive alternative, 
fulfilling both his need to help build a more united world and his tacit but deeply-rooted desire to keep in touch with his 
European background.”) (internal citations omitted). 
36 Joseph H. H Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMPARATIVE 
POLITICAL STUDIES 510–34 (1994). 
37 Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarship on the European Union: The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 859, 889 (2014). 
38 The scholarly shift from international law to European Community law was a common route, but not the exclusive 
one. The early generation of European Community lawyers also included researchers from the fields of business law, 
private international law, and comparative law.  Our thanks to Jan Komárek for this helpful comment. 
39 Id. at 530–31. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647178
14 
 
had a clear vision of what he wanted the Community to become. And for the Community to achieve its 
potential as a peace-enhancing alternative to international law, it was essential that the ECJ gain power 
over state sovereignty and establish itself as the unquestioned highest authority in its jurisdiction.   
 
Stein’s image of an authoritative and centralized supreme court appears to be heavily influenced by the 
nineteenth century jurisprudence of Chief Justice John Marshall.40 In the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, 
the Marshall Court established the principle of judicial review, which empowered it to strike down federal 
legislation that conflicted with the U.S. Constitution.41 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a state tax levied on a federal bank incorporated by the government under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was unconstitutional.42 In Martin v. Hunter Lessee,43 Justice Story justified through popular 
sovereignty the Supreme Court’s judicial authority to strike down unconstitutional state laws to maintain 
national uniformity. In these, and many lesser-known decisions consolidating federal judicial supremacy,44 
advocates for states’ rights, thanks to a cautiously interventionist Supreme Court, suffered a series of 
setbacks. 45   
 
The philosophy of natural law deeply influenced the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.46  In Federalist 78, 
Hamilton provided a very convincing picture of the federal courts as institutions without a “will” and 
composed of a body of independent judges, professionally trained with life-tenure appointments. The 
 
 
40 John Marshall served as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1801-1835. During Marshall’s tenure, the 
power and prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court grew considerably. Today Chief Justice Marshall’s record has been 
reconsidered in upholding the institution of slavery, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE 
NATION’S HIGHEST COURT (2018). 
41 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
42 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause, or elastic clause 
of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.  
43 See Martin v. Hunter Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
44 See Chisholm v. Georgia and Barron v. Baltimore [ Chief Justice Marshall’s cautious attempt to address the nation-
state relationship in favor of a “consolidated national union.” McCloskey p. 22] and for a comparison between this early 
SCOTUS jurisprudence and the ECJ see LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001). 
 
46 Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365–409 
(1929). 
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Founding Fathers’ emphatic affirmation of the principles of fundamental law gave the Constitution, as 
Robert McCloskey put it, its “odor of sanctity” and allowed the Supreme Court to assume a “priestly 
mantle.”47 The “least dangerous branch,” according to Hamilton, was exactly what Chief Justice Marshall 
was planning to achieve in Marbury v. Madison. In establishing the power of judicial review of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the justices interpreted the U.S. Constitution within the boundaries established by 
fundamental law.  But in practice, they too carried out their obligations within the boundaries of what 
“popular opinion would tolerate.”48 The justices knew very well they could not become completely 
detached from what the people would accept. 
 
The other more recent influence on Stein was the legacy of the Warren Court (1953-1969), led by the 
progressive former California governor Chief Justice Earl Warren.49  By the time Stein had received his 
law degree, the U.S. Supreme Court had long overruled its laissez faire jurisprudence50 and the New Deal 
settlement had allowed newly elected justices to grant Congress greater leeway to regulate market 
activities, going as far as authorizing federal regulation of wheat grown on a local farm for local 
consumption.51 While limiting its judicial scrutiny for individual economic rights,52 in 1938 the Carolene 
Products Court, in its famous footnote four, suggested it would undertake more rigorous judicial scrutiny 
when the civil liberties or civil rights of minorities were threatened due to an inability to access equal 




47 Robert G. McCloskey, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, p. 8 (revised by Sanford Levinson, 6th ed. 2006). 
48 Id. at 9. 
49 See LUCAS A. POWE JR, WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2001); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: 
A PUBLIC LIFE (1982). MORTON HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1999)  ED CRAY, 
CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN (2008). 
50 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
51 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and for a critical view of the elitist judicial supremacy created by the 
Warren Court at the expense of popular constitutionalism, see Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 
HARVARD. L. REV. 5, 122 (2001); see generally, LUCAS A. POWE JR, WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2001) 
p. 5-6. 
52 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937) [The Supreme Court upheld a minimum wage law for women 
holding that liberty of contract a subset of liberty that could be limited by public interest.] 
53 See United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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When Stein began his career at Michigan Law school, the U.S. Supreme Court “was a Court of gods—
Black, Douglas, Warren—hurling thunderbolts to start our cultural revolutions.”54  In 1954, in Brown v. 
Board of Education, Chief Justice Warren famously affirmed, “in the field of public education the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”55 In Gideon v. Wainwright, Warren worked hard behind the scenes to 
reach another unanimous ruling that required States under the Sixth Amendment to provide the right to 
counsel to defendants who were unable to afford a lawyer in criminal cases.56 In Warren’s five to four 
Miranda v. Arizona majority opinion, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment required that law 
enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during 
interrogations while in police custody.57 Finally in 1967, Warren wrote another unanimous opinion, Loving 
v. Virginia, that struck down a state law prohibiting inter racial marriage in violation of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 Such jurisprudence was rightly 
praised for rendering illegitimate the prevalent mechanisms and practices of racial discrimination. In 
retrospect, critical race scholars like Derrick Bell have shown the failures for black youths of the judicial 
integrationist ideal,59 while Sheila Foster pointed out how the notion of “racial agency” was “lost in the 
translation of specific claims of racial injustice into abstract constitutional principle.”60 
 
Living, as Stein did, through a period when the Warren Court made marked advances in “the 
constitutional guarantee of equality between races, between voters, and between criminal defendants,”61 
it is not surprising that he invested much of his considerable intellectual and organizational talents in 
 
 
54 See https://newrepublic.com/article/104659/warren-court-children. 
55 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
56 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years in Law 
Enforcement Affected His Work as Chief Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 11-32 (2005)  
57 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
58 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967). 
59 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 
85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
60 See Sheila Foster, Race, Agency, and Equal Protection: A Retrospective on the Warren Court in EARL WARREN 
AND THE WARREN COURT: THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW, HARRY N. SCHEIBER ED. (2007). 
61 See William F. Swindler, The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutional Revolution, 23 VAND. L. REV. 205, 206 
(1969). 
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pursuit of the “constitutionalization” of European Community law and the expansion of judicial 
supremacy while omitting the tainted history of the states’ rights and popular sovereignty jurisprudence.62 
 
 
2. Stein’s Strategic Omission of States’ Rights 
 
The delegates who drafted the U.S. Constitution are often celebrated for producing a document that 
managed to win the support of a diverse group of states and statesmen, but as McCloskey memorably 
puts it: “this congenial result had been achieved not only by compromise but by forbearance.”63 Indeed, 
the U.S. Constitution was so open-ended that genuine uncertainty existed in 1790 as to whether the 
document had created a league of sovereign states or a new nation. As states’ rights advocates repeatedly 
stressed from the period of the Marshall Court onward, had the Founding Fathers intended for the U.S. 
Supreme Court to wield a tool as powerful as judicial review, it is odd that they should have granted it in 
such an oblique manner, rather than forthrightly.64  
 
In truth, the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on the relationship between federal and state powers are non-
coherent, and they remain politically contested to this day. Legal historians have highlighted how 
ideological shifts discernable in U.S. constitutionalism tilt it either in favor of a federal plenary power or 
in favor of states’ rights. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of Independence,65 
 
 
62 For a critical view of the elitist judicial supremacy created by the Warren Court at the expense of popular 
constitutionalism, see Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 122 (2001) and the more 
cautious response by Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004). 
63 Robert G. McCloskey, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (revised by Sanford Levinson, 6th ed. 2006). As the author 
explains the Constitution set forth important principles about which there was no serious disagreement among the 
colonists, but “weightier difficulties that might have prevented ratification were either left severely alone by the 
Founding Fathers or treated in ambiguous clauses that passed the problems on to posterity.” 
64 Id. Explaining that the U.S. Constitution did not clearly provide the U.S. Supreme Court with superior authority over 
state supreme courts, and a close reading of the text leaves questionable whether the U.S. Supreme Court has the power 
to strike down national legislative acts inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution. 
65 Melvin I. Urofsky, Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall: What Kind of Constitution Shall We Have? 32 JOURNAL OF 
SUPREME COURT HISTORY 109, 117 (2006) explaining  Jefferson as also Chief Justice Marshall’s third cousin once 
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who was deeply influenced by the French revolutionary experience, was the period’s foremost advocate 
for popular sovereignty. For Jefferson, the states provided the most effective safeguard of the nation’s 
freedoms and self-rule, and the U.S. Supreme Court had shamelessly exceeded its mandate. When the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793),66 that for the purposes of the Union, “Georgia 
is not a sovereign state,” Congress promptly passed the XI Amendment, which overrode the Court’s 
ruling and placed the states on a stronger footing vis-à-vis the federal courts.67 Popular sovereignty acted 
at the same time as a source of legitimacy and a counterweight to judicial governance. 
 
Surely Stein was well aware of this, but his work hardly explored the Jeffersonian perspective. As Boerger 
shows, Stein’s Bellagio grant to study the role of courts in building common markets became 
controversial because the “undertaking clearly bore a political overtone.”68 Even Stein’s friend and well-
known comparative law scholar, Otto Kahn-Freund, began to doubt the scientific method behind Stein’s 
project, which aimed to demonstrate how the highest courts in both the U.S. and Europe represented 
the most “federalist constitutional organ.”69 In highlighting the correspondence between these two 
scholars, Boerger shows that Khan-Freund was worried that Stein would dismiss too easily the 
“centrifugal forces, the resistances, the great power and the strong case of our ‘Jeffersonian’ of 1979.”70 
 
Indeed, the work of the new European legal historians71 has shed light on Jeffersonian attitudes in Europe 
through national resistances to European legal integration and to ECJ judicial governance, emanating not 
only from domestic courts, but also from executive branches of governments, diplomatic circles and the 
 
 
removed and he “went to his grave believing that Marshall and his colleagues on the Supreme Court were evil, a gang . . 
. hell-bent on sabotaging the republican government from within.”. 
66 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) here the Supreme Court held that Article 3, Section 2, of the 
Constitution abrogated the states' sovereign immunity and granted federal courts the affirmative power to hear disputes 
between private citizens and states. 
67 Robert G. McCloskey, supra note 65. 
68 Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarship on the European Union: The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 859, 883 (2014). 
69 Id. at 884. 
70 Id.  
71 See Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History of European Law, 21 CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HISTORY, 305–18 
(2012). 
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media.72 For instance, historians have traced the resistance of the Gaullistes in France at odds with 
Christian Democratic politicians such a Jacques Delors73 in their attempt to limit preliminary references 
to the ECJ.74 In 1979 the National Assembly had to intervene to require domestic courts to accept the 
hierarchy of EC law over French national law.75 In the Italian and German realms, the resistance was 
prominent in the early 1970s, spearheaded by Constitutional Court decisions such as Frontini76 and 
Solange,77 which asserted the predominance of domestic courts as the ultimate defenders of fundamental 
rights.    
 
It might be a stretch to equate U.S. popular sovereignty and the states’ rights jurisprudence of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to the early national resistances in EU law.  The latter were triggered by national 
constitutional courts seeking to affirm the relevance of fundamental rights against the ECJ78 and by 
domestic judiciaries revamping their national legal traditions.79 Nevertheless, it appears reasonably clear 
that Stein was not eager to recognize the legitimacy of the early opposition expressed by political and 
legal elites to the creation of a supranational legal order.80 
 
 
72 See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE. WEST GERMANY'S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN 
LAW, 1949-1979 (2012.) 
73 See Alexandre Bernier, La France et le droit communautaire 1958-1981: Histoire d’une réception et d’une co-
production (2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Copenhagen). 
74 Vera Fritz, The First Member State Rebellion? The European Court of Justice and the Negotiations of the 
‘Luxembourg Protocol’ of 1971, 21 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 680–699 (2015). 
75 Morten. Rasmussen, How to Enforce European Law? A New History of the Battle over the Direct Effect of Directives, 
1958-1987, 23 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, 290–308 (2017).  
76 Frontini case, Italian Constitutional Court Sentenza n. 183 (18 December 1973). 
77 Solange I, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft von Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, decision 
of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974]. 
78 See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 
11/70), EU:C:1970:114, [1970] and Bill Davies, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Miscalculation at the 
Inception of the CJEU’s Human Rights Jurisprudence, p. 157 in EU LAW STORIES (B. DAVIES AND F. NICOLA, EDS. 
2017). 
79 See Fernanda G. Nicola, National Legal Traditions at Work in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 64 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (2016). 
80 See Morten Rasmussen, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, EU Constitutionalization Revisited: Redressing a Central 
Assumption in European Studies, 25 European Law Journal (2019). 





II. Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph Weiler’s Vision of Judicial Review  
Part II engages with the contributions of Mauro Cappelletti and Joseph H. H. Weiler to the European 
image of U.S.-style judicial review.  We argue that, in a manner analogous to Stein, who advocated for 
ECJ supremacy and downplayed U.S. states’ rights movements, Cappelletti and Weiler exported to 
Europe a judicial review utopia—one which drew on the U.S. experience, but side-stepped the political 
explosiveness that has regularly beset U.S. Supreme Court judicial review in practice. By deploying the 
fiction of judicial neutrality, European law scholars advanced a more attractive blueprint for European 
legal integration than the U.S. historical record actually offered. 
 
1. Neutral Judicial Review as Liberal Legalism 
 
In 1971, Cappelletti published Judicial Review in the Contemporary World, a short but highly influential book 
that traced the spread of judicial review from the United States to much of the rest of the world.81 
Through his book and later publications, Cappelletti presented judicial review as the ultimate safeguard 
of fundamental values against majoritarian political institutions.82 In a recent publication that builds on 
and extends Cappelletti’s work, Doreen Lustig and Weiler observe that Cappelletti viewed judicial review 
as an “unqualified public good”83 and courts “as the most efficient guarantee for the effectiveness and 
 
 
81 See, e.g. Mauro Cappelletti, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1971) (detailing how judicial review 
spread from the United States to many countries around the world). 
82 Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay, JUDICIAL REVIEW, TRANSNATIONAL AND FEDERAL: ITS IMPACT ON 
INTEGRATION, EUI Working Paper No. 4. (September 1981). 
83 Doreen Lustig & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—Retrospective and Prospective, 
16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 315, 316 (2018). For a critique of this work, see Mila Versteeg, Understanding The Third Wave of 
Judicial Review: Afterword to the Foreword by Doreen Lustig and JHH Weiler. 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 10 (2019) 
(arguing that the authors seem unwilling to seriously entertain the possibility that domestic courts are closely examining 
international legal norms, not because they are detached, neutral arbiters in search of higher truths, but rather more 
prosaically, because they are bending to social and political pressure). 
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enforcement of” individual rights and liberties.84 In Cappelletti’s view, the revival of judicial review in 
Europe was a logical reaction to fascism and World War II, which “demonstrated the horrendous 
potential for tyranny, even majority tyranny, of governments not subject to constitutional restraint”.85 
Cappelletti readily acknowledged that judicial review was not implemented in the same way in every 
country, but he identified a cross-European consensus that unchecked parliamentary sovereignty had the 
potential to pose an existential threat to democratic governance.  
 
Cappelletti was not only a proponent of judicial review in general terms. He also made it quite clear that 
he saw the ECJ, rather than the Member State courts, as the proper institution to entrust “the ultimate 
judicial authority in the Community as regards questions of fundamental rights”.86  In The Transformation 
of Europe, Weiler weaves a complementary theme into his own work, asserting that the 
constitutionalization of EU law was undoubtedly aided by “that deep-seated legitimacy that derives from 
the mythical neutrality and religious-like authority with which we invest our supreme courts”.87 Faith in 
the power of judicial review as a superior arbiter defending individual rights or solving institutional 
conflicts without engaging with the underlying political economy and racial capitalism goes hand-in-glove 
with faith in the ability of judges to make rulings in a fair and impartial manner. 
 
US legal realism has revealed the untold implications and ideologies disguised under liberal legalism in the 
rulings handed down during the Gilded Age by a Supreme Court that benefited property owners and 
business elites united by a common laissez-faire ideology.88 Due to its low legitimacy in the aftermath of 
 
 
84 Doreen Lustig & Joseph H.H. Weiler, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World—Retrospective and Prospective, 
16 INT’L J. CONST. L. 315, 316 (2018). 
85 Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay, JUDICIAL REVIEW, TRANSNATIONAL AND FEDERAL: ITS IMPACT ON 
INTEGRATION, EUI Working Paper No. 4. (September 1981) at 16. 
86 Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay, JUDICIAL REVIEW, TRANSNATIONAL AND FEDERAL: ITS IMPACT ON 
INTEGRATION, EUI Working Paper No. 4. (September 1981) at 79-80. 
87 J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe 100 YALE L. J., 2403, 2426–30 (1991); Joseph H. H Weiler, A Quiet 
Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors, 26 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 510–34 (1994). 
88 See MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A PRIVILEGED MOMENT 
IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND FRANCE (1994). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647178
22 
 
Dred Scott,89 the Supreme Court focused strictly on questions of economic control rather than racial 
emancipation while endorsing liberal legalism and its abstract legal reasoning.  As early as 1873 in the 
Slaughter-House Cases,90 the plaintiffs’ lawyers made a creative argument using the XIV Amendment, which 
was intended to eliminate racial subordination, to instead protect any person against State laws that would 
“deprive any person of life, liberty and property, without due process of law.”91 The U.S. Supreme Court 
gradually accepted the liberal notion that liberty of contract was enforceable as an individual right under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 A few years later, the U.S. Supreme Court was 
ready to interpret the notion of freedom of contract as derived directly from Herbert Spencer.93 The 
Court reached the apex of its laissez faire jurisprudence in Lochner v. New York, which held that the freedom 
of contract was under substantive due process a limit to the valid exercise of states’ police powers.94 
Justice Oliver W. Holmes’s dissent rejected the notion of freedom of contract as a displacement of the 
basic notion that states had the power to regulate the economy. Instead he famously explained that the 
 
 
89 Id. and in hindsight Dred Scott seemed stunningly self-destructive. “In the 1850s the Court enjoyed popular support 
as nearly unanimous as can ever be expected in a diverse democratic society,” notes McCloskey. “Eight years later, it 
had forfeited that position, and its role in the American polity was nearly negligible..” 
90 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), in which the dissenters Justices Joseph Bradley and Stephen Field 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable government 
interference. 
91 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In the Slaughter-House Cases a group of butchers argued that a highly corrupted 
legislature in Louisiana adopted a law granting an economic monopoly without obvious public policy reasons. As a result, 
the butchers claimed that such law violated their occupational freedom. Even though the Court did not side with the 
butchers, the path was open for lawyers to deploy the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individual rights as a substantive 
due process guarantee embedding the principle of laissez-faire against economic legislation in Constitutional 
interpretation. Robert McCloskey, supra note 65 p.79. 
92 See Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (1972).  
93 Robert McCloskey, supra note 65 at 88 showing how in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 in 1897 for the first time 
the Court invalidated a state law violating of liberty of contract. 
94 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) in which the Supreme Court held that a New York law limiting the 
working hours for bakers violated the Fourteen Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In his opinion, Justice Peckham 
held that in the absence of evidence that the hours law protected public health, or that the jobs of bakers was in need of 
adequate regulations due to health reasons, the New York law constituted an unjustified interference with individual 
liberty of contract 
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Constitution should not embody any particular economic theory nor that general propositions should 
decide concrete case. 95  
In his review essay, Why read The Transformation of Europe today?, Komárek expresses skepticism about 
Weiler’s characterization of European courts as catalysts for change. For Komárek, Transformation is an 
article “about Europe”, but “embedded in the American culture of liberal legalism that had been 
dominant at law schools in the United States until the mid-1980s”.  In particular, it “exhibits the trust in 
courts (especially the ECJ) similar to that of [American] legal liberals”. 96This proposition led Weiler to 
overestimate the transformative power of European courts as detached from the socio-economic 
struggles dividing the Community along the North-South and later on, the East-West cleavage.  
Far from playing an “exalted role” in the integration of EU law, Komárek argues that the European 
courts of the 1960s and 1970s were nothing more than institutional players, engaged in mundane, 
bureaucratic tasks: “There was nothing mystical or religious about them”, he concludes. While we agree 
with Komarek’s view, our task is to stress how Weiler’s communitarian philosophy, focusing on popular 
sovereignty and the lack of a European demos, was struggling with figuring out ways for a Community 
as legitimated by its people.97 Living in the U.S. under the legacy of the Rehnquist Court, Weiler was not 
committed, as Stein was, to the form of U.S. constitutional law interpretation that was espoused by “his” 
U.S. Supreme Court.  To the contrary, he distanced himself from the Rehnquist Court and avoided 
reference to contemporary state rights’ doctrines when he addressed U.S.-style judicial federalism. 
 
2.  Downplaying the State Rights’ Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court 
Indeed, during the time period when Weiler was invoking a liberal legalist image of the ECJ and judicial 
federalism as a way to resolve institutional competence conflicts without engaging with the underlying 
 
 
95 Id. 89 showing how by 1917, the Supreme Court upheld labor reforms including workers’ compensation laws and 
minimum wages and hours for all industrial workers, that severely undermined the doctrine of freedom of contract. 
96 See Jan Komárek, European constitutionalism: Towards an ‘ideology critique’ (paper on file with the author). 
97 See Joseph H. Weiler, Europe's Sonderweg (Harvard Jean Monnet working paper 2001) and for a response see Peter 
L. Lindseth, Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-
Polity, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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political economy implications of federal adjudication, the Rehnquist Court was transforming U.S. 
federalism. The Rehnquist court was reinterpreting states’ rights in ways that were strongly opposed by 
liberals and praised by conservatives also looking at Europe as a model for states’ rights.98  In the same 
year that Weiler published Transformation, David Day described the U.S. Supreme Court in unabashedly 
political terms: 
[T]he concept of federalism is a major doctrinal concern of the Rehnquist Court. 
After all, on the political level federalism has had close attachment to the Republican 
party and its recent domination of the Presidency. On the level of judicial doctrine, 
the modern federalism concept has provided a supportable and convenient vehicle 
for the conservative retrenchment of various constitutional doctrines.99 
The Rehnquist Court used its power of judicial review to strike down a federal law designed to regulate 
gun possession in school zones,100 concluded that the federal government could not compel State officers 
to administer background checks on prospective handgun owners,101 and ruled unconstitutional a law 
that provided a federal civil remedy for gender-based violence, arguing that Congress’ act threatened “to 
completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority . . . ”102.   
As scholars of U.S. constitutional law and EU law, the most glaring omission we find in most European 
legal scholarship on U.S.-style judicial review are the many instances when U.S. courts failed to protect 
minorities from the tyranny of the majority. The U.S. Supreme Court has suffered its fair share of crises 
of legitimacy, many of which have been precipitated by controversial judgments involving race relations 
and state rights. The Dred Scott Court endorsed slavery, the Plessy Court sided with racial segregationists 
 
 
98 See Richard H. Fallon, The 'Conservative' Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
429, (2002). Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 Texas Law Review 1-165 (2004) Ernest A. 
Young ,What Can Europe Tell Us About the Future of American Federalism?, 49 Arizona State Law Journal 1109-1140 
(2017). 
99 David S. Day, The Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Potential Unsettling of the 
Well-Settled Principles, 22 U. Tol. L. Rev. 675, (1991).  
100 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (holding that the “Gun Free Zone Act of 1990” exceeded 
Congress’ authority under the commerce clause). 
101 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933(1997). 
102 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). 
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and white supremacy ideology. These, and other decisions that comprise the so-called “anti-canon” of 
U.S. constitutional law, will remain blights on the institution for as long as it exists. To take just one 
particularly egregious example, consider Dred Scott, which is broadly understood among U.S. 
constitutional scholars and political scientists as the nadir of the U.S. Supreme Court’s legitimacy.103 The 
legacy of Dred Scott legacy still haunts the Court to this days. In Obergefell v. Hodges,104 the Court held that 
the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts accused 
the majority of failing to uphold the principle of judicial restraint, leaving such decisions to the legislative 
branch or to the states, just as it had failed, with disastrous consequences, in Dred Scott. 
 
Legitimacy is a precious commodity for the “least dangerous branch”.105 Its independence is precarious—
contingent on the support, or at a minimum, the assent, of the public and the other branches.  It is also 
fallible in entrenching economic inequalities and failing to grapple with racial capitalism. At times it has 
risen to the occasion, boldly protecting minority rights and fundamental values, but such task depending 
on the judicial elites in power and the socio-economic struggles has not always proved capable of carrying 
out the august role that Cappelletti and Weiler have assigned to judicial review.   
 
III. The Adverse Consequences of Europe’s Dominant Constitutional Paradigm 
The failure to grapple with racial capitalism as racial differentiation and subordination in capitalist 
societies created an inadequate framework to address Europe’s post-war colonial legacy.  Indeed, such a 
reckoning was to European politicians and scholars alike, almost antithetical to the axiomatic fiction that 
Community law was created from a tabula rasa after World War II. In truth, Europe’s economy was solidly 
grounded in racial capitalism—the notion that racial differentiation would start in the West where the 
fabrication of whiteness began at the same time that capitalism emerged so that the two produced “racial 
 
 
103 There is, however, a small body of revisionist literature that argues that the decision was a centrist opinion. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT 271 (1997); Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott as a Centrist Decision, 83 NCL REV. 1229 (2004). 
104 576 U.S (2015). 
105 In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton provided a very convincing picture of the federal courts as institutions without 
“will” and composed of a body of independent judges, professionally trained with life-tenure appointments. 
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capitalism”, a system able to justify slavery, violence and imperialism.106 This is because, as Cedric J. 
Robison explains, at the very same times that European labor was “herded into a newly formed industrial 
order,” African labor was globalized by the slave trade and incorporated in modern forms of production 
through racial subordination and exploitation.107 
 
 
1. The Suppression of Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism  
International lawyers have shown how racial capitalism allowed the Spanish crown to appropriate and 
sell Africans though the Atlantic slave trade.108 The literature produced by radical black Marxists since 
the 1950s is abundant and re-tells a story of the industrial revolution and the rise of nineteenth century 
bourgeoisie through the lens of racial capitalism.109 More recently legal historians have carefully shown 
how the wealth accumulated through slave labor in cotton and tobacco industries during the industrial 
revolution was capitalized and securitized in the New York and London stock exchanges.110  
 
But rather than view this process as racial capitalism, the European founding fathers addressed it as part 
of their strategy to promote African economic development. The Schuman declaration of May 9, 1950, 
the founding document of the Coal and Steel Community, ends not only with the need to secure peace 
but also with the following sentence: 
 
 
106 See Robin D.G. Kelly, Foreword, CEDRICK J. ROBISON, BLACK MARXISM, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL 
TRADITION, (2000 edition). 
107 Id. at XIV. 
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“With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one 
of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.”111 
 
Rather than openly engaging with racial capitalism as a central reason for the exploitation of the African 
continent, the notion of how Europe should contribute to “African development” remerges today in the 
Commission’s Trade for All agenda.112 The document effectively dismisses racial capitalism and the trade 
and migration effects of its colonial legacy.113  The newly formed Commission committed to promoting 
a European Way of Life appears unprepared to acknowledge Europe’s role in promoting racial capitalism 
and its link to the rise of right-wing populist leaders with xenophobic traits in Hungary, Poland and 
Italy.114  The idea that Europe’s colonial past justifies more generous migratory policies or redistribution 
through trade agreements with Europe’s former colonies enjoys little to no political support. To the 
extent that race remains on the agenda, politicians and scholars confine it, implicitly, to trade 
agreements115 and policies to address illegal immigrants at the borders.116 
 
The relationship between racial structures and the accumulation of wealth and power in Europe attracts 
relatively little attention in European law scholarship as well.  The few exceptions include Eddie Bruce-
Jones, who has linked institutional racisms to Europe’s colonial past,117 Iyiola Solanke, who has traced 
the deeper psychological roots of racial discrimination to theories of stigma,118 and scholarship that has 
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shown how racism and ethnic differentiation are deeply entrenched in Europe’s treatment and 
stereotyping of Roma population throughout the Union.119 Approaching the topic from a comparative 
perspective, some scholars have noticed how Critical Race Theory, which has blossomed in U.S. law 
schools since the 1980s, has faced stiff resistance in European law scholarship. Mathias Möschel has 
linked this outcome in European scholarship to a “double displacement” entailing the fact that the 
colonies remain outside the European territory and that racism, in the form of antisemitism, has been 
formally outlawed in the continent since the Holocaust.120 At the formal level, antisemitism is harshly 
rejected by governments and constitutional courts, yet the resurgence of antisemitism, racism and 




2. Shortcomings of EU Anti-Racist Legislation 
In 2000, the EU adopted its first piece of anti-racist legislation: Directive 2000/43, 121 commonly known 
as the Race Equality Directive. It prohibits discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin, in, among 
other areas, employment and access to goods and services. Shortly thereafter, the EU adopted a second 
piece of legislation, Directive 2000/78, 122  also known as the Employment Equality Directive. This 
directive extends anti-discrimination protections to more grounds—religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation—but applies only to the field of employment. 
 
Among the protected grounds covered under EU law, race discrimination was the primary concern of 
EU legislators. In fact, it is probably not an overstatement to say that the fate of anti-racist legislation was a prerequisite 
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for EU legislation covering all other grounds. Most accounts of the origins of Directive 2000/78 describe it as 
“riding in the wake” or “on the coattails” of the momentum produced by the Race Equality Directive. 
And yet, since the adoption of the Race Equality Directive only three judgments that address racial 
discrimination have reached the ECJ.123 Despite advances in many of the other “new” grounds,124 there 
appears to be an unwillingness or inability to enlist domestic courts to refer questions to the ECJ on race.  
 
Early on, scholars like Daniela Caruso pointed out the limits of positive action in the EU due to historical 
and conceptual underpinnings of the myth of identity blindness, especially in French Law.125 More 
recently, Mathilde Cohen’s interview-based study of the French judiciary strongly suggests that many 
French public officials are wary of even entertaining the possibility that race could play a role in how 
individuals are treated in society.126  It is not difficult to imagine why the Race Equality Directive would 
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be rarely invoked before a judiciary that “not only refuse[s] to name races and ethnicities, but also denie[s] 
the legitimacy of these categories.” 127  
 
Two recent rulings, Achbita,128 and the case that joined to it, Bougnaoui,129 illustrate the reluctance of the 
ECJ to confront racial discrimination head-on. In fairness to the court, neither case was brought as race 
discrimination case, although they certainly could have become one without too much interpretative 
stretch.130 Achbita involved a Muslim woman who was instructed not to wear a hijab (headscarf) because 
it violated the employer’s neutrality policy.  The ECJ sided with the employer, ruling that its interest 
outweighed Achbita’s. As AG Kokott forthrightly stated in the introduction to her opinion, the case 
came before the court during difficult times: 
 
There is no need to highlight here the social sensitivity inherent in this issue, 
particularly in the current political and social context in which Europe is confronted 
with an arguably unprecedented influx of third-country migrants and the question of 
how best to integrate persons from a migrant background is the subject of intense 
debate in all quarters.131 
 
It is heavily disputed whether the Court struck the correct balance in the current political climate between 
the defendant-business’s interest in a secular workplace and Achbita’s freedom of religious.132  Less 
frequently discussed, but we think equally worthy of consideration, are the factors that led the plaintiffs 
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We share Matej Avbelj’s intuition that the partial reception of U.S. constitutionalism has misled 
scholarship on European legal integration.134 At crucial moments in the intellectual history of EU law, 
this partial reception served a strategic purpose for scholars of legal integration. It provided the 
conceptual framework they needed to promote European constitutionalism, buttressed by an ostensibly 
politically neutral, supranational judicial review power for the ECJ.  In Stein’s scheme, reflecting on the 
successful legacy of the Warren court,135 U.S. constitutionalism was a promising model to strengthen the 
Community’s supranational constitutional project. In the works of Weiler and Cappelletti, judicial review 
became a normatively appealing and politically neutral legal tool of federal integration that ignored the 
near-concurrent revamping of states’ rights under the Rehnquist Court. But this partial reception also 
underplayed the United States’ politically contested judicial history and its roots in racial capitalism.136  
In European law scholarship the comparison with a “U.S.-inspired constitutionalism” has often been 
deployed as an ahistorical and liberal legalist narrative of judicial review and federalism that has been 
molded to fit integrationist agendas.137 This selective reception of U.S. constitutionalism has set aside 
national resistances, created self-defeating expectations and most importantly blunted the legal tools 
necessary to address racial subordination and economic exploitation in EU law. 
Today it is especially important to foreground the darker legacies of U.S. constitutionalism and their 
many analogues in EU law instead of expelling them from the European constitutional heritage.138 The 
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project of European legal integration is now more important than ever, but it will not survive unless it 
confronts its own structural flaws. “Fortress Europe” has created deep inequalities in the EU-African 
trade relationship, and these economic inequalities have returned to haunt Europe with unstoppable 
migratory fluxes. Market integration, as enforced by the ECJ in the name of free movement, has produced 
ambivalent distributive effects.139 And the EU’s management of the sovereign debt crisis since 2010 has 
seriously undermined certain states’ ability to sustain social safety-nets,140 and duly receive migrants.141 In 
crafting a new constitutional paradigm, lawyers, judges, and scholars must now be especially wary of 
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